The Egyptian government cannot rely on security crackdowns alone no matter how tempting that is.
The recent, brutal killings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya by
an ISIL-affiliate is likely to harden the Egyptian government's
campaign in the east against militants of the so-called "Sinai
Province", another ISIL-affiliated group formerly known as Ansar Beit
al-Maqdis.
But from all indications this battle is unlikely to end soon. The
terrorist group has been able to stage a number of attacks against
beefed-up Egyptian security forces in the Sinai. In late January, for
example, it killed 30 people, mostly members of the security forces, and
injured at least 50 others.
This serious incident prompted Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to shake up the military in the Sinai, creating a unified command
there under the leadership of General Osama Roshdy Askar who has been
given the responsibility of guiding counterterrorism operations of the
second and third armies in the peninsula.
Government response
On February 6, the government responded to the Sinai attack by
reportedly killing a total of 47 militants in a day-long operation in
the north Sinai region.
A week later, it unleashed air strikes against a terrorist stronghold
near Rafah, close to the Egypt-Gaza border, reportedly killing a
terrorist leader and seven of his cohorts.
Around this time, another terrorist group, Ajnad Misr - which may or
may not be affiliated with Ansar Beit al-Maqdis - claimed credit for
detonating an explosive device in Cairo's Ain Shams district, killing a police officer and injuring nine others, including a civilian.
Although the terrorists have been on the receiving end of many
casualties and may have lost some ground in the Sinai - a year ago some
areas of the peninsula were too dangerous even for Egyptian military
patrols - they are likely to remain a thorn in the government's side for
some time to come.
The reasons are multifaceted, having to do with the military
tactics of both the terrorists and the government, as well as poor
socioeconomic conditions facing the mostly Bedouin inhabitants of the
Sinai.
First, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis or the Sinai Province has demonstrated that it is just as brutal
as other ISIL-affiliated groups in its tactics - decapitating so-called
informants and dumping their bodies by roadsides as a warning to
others.
Chilling effect
These actions probably have had a chilling effect on those
Bedouin who see the terrorists as an enemy and are inclined to help the
security forces but are too scared to do so. This has likely limited the
amount of intelligence on the terrorists that the security forces are
able to receive.
Second, the Egyptian government has often used heavy-handed measures against whole Bedouin villages if it suspected that one or two of the villages' young people aided or joined the terrorists.
Security forces have also employed other draconian policies such as
cutting down hundreds of olive trees by roadsides - purportedly because
they give cover to terrorist ambushes - and demolishing hundreds of
homes near Rafah. |
Security forces have also employed other draconian policies such as
cutting down hundreds of olive trees by roadsides - purportedly because
they give cover to terrorist ambushes - and demolishing hundreds of
homes near Rafah because it wants a "clear zone" near Gaza where they
can better monitor terrorist activities and stop tunnels into Gaza.
These policies have had the unintended effect of probably
creating more recruits for the terrorists than would otherwise be the
case. The deaths of innocent Bedouin villagers in particular have likely
caused many of their relatives to join the terrorist groups to exact
revenge on the security forces.
One Egyptian military officer who has interrogated militants in the Sinai recently told a reporter for Reuters
that: "One of them recalled how his brother was killed by the security
forces. He described how his sister-in-law cried and urged him to take
revenge or else he would look weak."
Underlying problems
An underlying problem is that the Bedouin of the Sinai have
long been a neglected population group - receiving less government funds
and services than mainland Egyptians - and suffer from high poverty and
unemployment rates.
Relatively well-paying jobs in the Sinai are confined to the
tourist sector in the southern part of the peninsula, and those
positions are usually filled by mainland Egyptians.
That at least some Bedouin have earned a living by smuggling
and other nefarious activities have reinforced the sentiment of many
mainland Egyptians and security forces that they cannot be trusted.
Bedouin are exempt from being drafted into the military and are
prohibited from joining the police services, which also serves to set
them apart from other Egyptian citizens.
To defeat the terrorists in the Sinai, the Egyptian government
cannot rely on security crackdowns alone (and it needs a more nimble
approach in this area to avoid civilian casualties), no matter how
tempting it is to use brute force against ISIL-affiliated groups.
It must address the socioeconomic problems in the Sinai to give
the Bedouin meaningful job prospects in order to dry up terrorist
recruitment. This should involve extensive job training programmes,
opening tourism and Sinai police force jobs to the Bedouin (albeit after
proper vetting) and compensation for homes and agricultural areas
destroyed in the counterterrorism campaign.
Otherwise, this campaign will go on without an end in sight.
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